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1. Introduction  
 
It is a broadly diffused idea among economists and policy makers that the innovative 
capacity and the ability to imitate new technologies adopted across regions are key factors in 
determining the rate of growth of an economic system (Solow, 1956; Romer, 1990; Aghion 
and Howitt, 1992; but also Metcalfe, 2003). Moreover, problems related to the production and 
the diffusion of innovations, make technology policy becoming one of the priorities in their 
agenda.  
        This work is concerned with the determinants of innovation and technological change. 
Trying to understand which are the conditions that affect the pace of innovation, is an obvious 
precondition to achieve in order to design effective policies, able to have a positive influence 
on the technological performance of an economy. There is a vast literature on the argument 
and a lot of different and, often, alternative perspectives emerge from it. The aim of this paper 
is to offer an overview on these contributions trying to place them in their proper theoretical 
framework. The paper will be divided in different subsections in which each determinant is 
individually considered through the presentation of the most relevant results achieved by the 
literature on the specific issue. Before doing this it will be useful to give some definitions in 
order to clarify some key concepts. 
                According to Joseph Schumpeter (1939), technological change is one of the major 
determinants of industrial change and consists of the introduction of new products (product 
innovation), production processes (process innovation) and management methods 
(organisational innovation) in an economic system. 
1 
The so called Shumpeterian trilogy distinguishes technological change in three different 
phases: Invention, Innovation and Diffusion. The first is related to the generation of new 
scientific and technological ideas, while the second is referred to the development of 
marketable novelties i.e. the introduction of novelties in the economic system. Finally, the 
distribution over time and space of the adoption of innovations is the diffusion stage. 
However, it is important to avoid coming across a mistake i.e. to believe that technological 
change should be intended as a linear process. This vision was expressed in origin by the 
linear model in which there is a one-way sequence of different phases of the type Science – 
Technology – Production. Here the scientific activity acts as an exogenous and neutral “deus 
ex machina” from which depends all the innovative process (Dosi, 1983). 
                                                 
1 Useful references on these general aspects are P. Stoneman(1995), C. Antonelli(1995,2003), F. Malerba (2000).    2
On the other hand, the chain model proposed by Klein and Rosemberg (1986), takes into 
account the presence of wide interrelations between the various stages of technological 
change process by considering information feedbacks existing along the all chain. In this way, 
the science and market joint contribution to the innovation process is effectively highlighted.  
In order to fully understand the arguments presented in next pages, it is important to 
mention the distinction between radical and incremental innovation and between global and 
local innovation. A radical innovation represents a breakpoint with the existing products and 
production processes while, an incremental one, implies only an improvement of them. On the 
other hand, for global innovation we intend a particular event, for example the introduction of 
a new machinery in a production process, that occurs for the first time at a global level 
whether a local one refers to a similar event which happens in a defined environment, for 
example at a firm level, and that is already happened somewhere else. 
                In a recent contribution by J. Furman, M. Porter and S. Stern (2002) it has been 
introduced the concept of national innovative capacity, which is “the ability of a country to 
produce and commercialise a flow of innovative technology over the long term”. In that paper 
they build up an econometric model, using panel data, in which the national innovative 
capacity is explained by a set of regressors representing the most significant determinants of 
innovation. The novelty of this new framework is that it takes inspiration from three different 
perspectives that emerged in the previous literature, that is what they label ideas-driven 
endogenous growth theory
2, the cluster-based theory of industrial competitive advantage
3 and 
the National Innovation Systems literature
4. The first approach is conducted at an aggregate 
level and, in particular Romer growth’s model(1990),  focuses on the definition of an ideas 
production function  which depends on the number of workers devoted to the development of 
novelties and the stock of knowledge accumulated in the past, available to ideas workers. On 
the other hand, Porter (1990) stresses the importance of the microeconomic environment such 
as the availability of innovation inputs like skilled workers, the local competitive context and 
the possibility to exploit cluster-level scale economies in particular when clusters are 
geographically concentrated. The National Innovation System approach differs from the 
others firstly for methodological issues.  
The origin of this analytical perspective can be found in the work of economists like 
Kuznets (1965), Rostow (1952, 1963) and Schumpeter (1939) and in the pioneering work, in 
                                                 
2 Here the main reference is Paul Romer (1990). 
3 This line of research was conducted principally by Michael Porter (1990).  3
the evolutionary economics field, of Nelson and Winter (1982) further developed by Dosi et 
al. (1988). It is a new framework of analysis for the economics of innovation in which, the 
equilibrium perspective of standard neoclassical theory, is challenged. This means that 
competition is not perceived from the viewpoint of an equilibrium state of economic agents 
and markets, but as a selection process emerging from the different behaviour of 
heterogeneous agents. Moreover, a further peculiarity of the National Innovation System 
literature is that its attention is focused on the analysis of the role played by institutions and 
public actors in determining the national innovative capacity. In this view institutions are 
seen, in general, as aimed at reducing uncertainty and represent a way to sustain accumulation 
and diffusion of knowledge. Differences in institutional and policy choices regarding 
universities, financial and patent systems, public research laboratories and R&D subsidies are 
perceived as key factors in shaping the rate of innovation.  
              The relevance of the work by Furman et al. (2002), is that they shed light on the 
differences but also on the complementarities of those three approaches trying to develop a 
model consistent with all of them. Having this kind of approach in mind we will try, in the 
next pages, to enter in the analysis of a single determinant believing that, taken all together, 
the three perspectives are able to shed light on the understanding of technological dynamics. 
It is in fact our opinion that such a multi-perspective analysis will help the reader to deal with 
the complexity of the innovation phenomenon. 
In next pages, we will not be able to deal with the analysis of the determinants of 
innovation keeping separate the three literature framework before highlighted. In fact, they 
often share common ideas about the key drivers of innovation, even if these are perceived 
from different perspectives. However, the specific contribution of each framework will be, as 
much as possible, systematically emphasized.  
 
 
2. Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation. 
 
This section deals with the analysis of the relationship between patents and innovation. 
We will show that, given the peculiar features of inventive activity, the system of property 
right protection may affect the pace of innovation. 
                                                                                                                                                          
4 This concept was introduced for the first time in the literature by C. Freeman (1987) and developed by 
Lundvall(1988,1998),Nelson(1993), Edquist and McKelvey (2000), Malerba (2002) and Carlsson et al. (2002).  4
As we have already seen, scientific knowledge is often involved in the production of 
innovation  but, the early contributions of  economists like R. Nelson (1959) and K. Arrow 
(1962), pointed out that knowledge shares some typical characteristics of public goods such 
indivisibility, non rivalry and the impossibility to exclude other agents from the use of that 
sort of information
5 . Given that reproduction costs for information are very low, it is possible 
to increase the number of users of that specific knowledge at marginal costs near to zero. 
Furthermore, as the number of consumer increases, the availability of a particular knowledge 
to former users is not affected.  
In the absence of legal protection, who develops new knowledge is not able to sell it 
without losing the derived monopolistic power because the buyer (if there is one considering 
also problems deriving from the presence of asymmetric information
6), can easily reproduce 
the acquired information and sell it again. The creation of new knowledge is obviously a case 
in which agent’s behaviour affects positively the welfare of other agents. Hence, the 
introduction of new knowledge produces positive externalities in the market. This fact was 
also confirmed, for example, by the empirical analysis conducted by Mansfield et al. (1977) 
in which they proved that there is, in general, high positive difference between social and 
private internal rate of return of R&D investments.   
Those particular characteristics of knowledge
7 creates huge difficulties in terms of the 
ability of market forces to produce a Pareto efficient allocation of resources devoted to 
innovative activities. For such reasons patent protection, that is in turn a way through which is 
possible to internalise the external effect above mentioned, is seen as a key driver of the rate 
of technological change in an economic system
8.  
A patent is a right granted to the inventor for a given period of time that allows just him 
to exploit commercial revenues deriving from the application of his own invention. Patents 
help the entry in markets especially for small and medium sized firms which are less able to 
protect their innovations in alternative ways, and support investments devoted to the 
introduction of radical innovations characterised by a high degree of uncertainty, elevated 
costs and long time lasting between the invention stage and the market introduction of 
innovation.  
                                                 
5 It is necessary to mention that Dosi (1988) and Dosi et al. (1988) noticed that great part of knowledge is tacit 
and localized so that it cannot be seen entirely as a public good. 
6 On this point, see for example Arrow (1962a). 
7 On the concept of knowledge and its governance see Antonelli (2004). 
8 Recently a new role of patents as a determinant of innovation has been proposed. They represent in fact a way 
to reduce transaction costs in the knowledge markets because patents can be used to signal the quality of 
knowledge embodied in a specific organization (Antonelli, 2004).  5
This argument emerges clearly in models, that according to Furman et al.(2002) we call 
ideas-driven endogenous growth models. As an example Romer(1986,1990) and Lucas(1988), 
propose models in which the notion of technological externalities is introduced. Here firm’s 
knowledge is assumed to be a public good, hence when new knowledge is discovered it 
spreads across the economy because spillover effects occur. Intellectual property right 
protection is needed because it is the way through which ex-ante incentives to inventive 
activities are provided. Along with this view, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999) assume 
explicitly that the inventor gains a monopoly power on the invention produced through the 
patent system.  
In designing an appropriate system of patent protection we have to deal with two 
different kinds of trade-offs. The first one is between static and dynamic efficiency while, the 
second one is between development and diffusion of innovations.   
The first trade off emerges from the fact that, through the patent system, a monopolistic 
power is granted to the inventor allowing him to earn monopoly rents. This is of course a 
source of inefficiency from a static point of view in fact, the presence of a difference between 
price and marginal costs, produces a deadweight loss in social welfare. On the other hand, we 
noticed that many innovations may not occur in the absence of a patent system and this will 
hamper the dynamic efficiency of an economy. It is interesting to note that Schumpeter 
(1942) went beyond this trade off arguing that pure profits that an innovator can collect are 
not a rent from a dynamic perspective. 
Turning to the second trade off, Nordhaus (1969) noticed that the number of innovations 
tends to grow as the protection accorded to the innovator increases because great part of the 
externalities produced are internalised, but the diffusion of an innovation through the 
economy is at the same time increasingly limited.  
Hence, the core of patent policy problems is to find the right combination of length and 
depth of protection that assure the right equilibrium between the two types of efficiency and 
between production and diffusion of innovations. A relevant contribution in the patent 
literature is the article of Gilbert and Shapiro (1990). They build up a model which predicts 
that, when a single innovation context is considered, the optimal patent regime consists in 
maximising the duration of patents. Of course, their result is not applicable to the case of a 
base technology that can be used to develop further innovations. If this is the case, a legal 
protection is needed because otherwise the innovative firm tends to postpone the introduction 
of the new technology until it is completely refined, determining a delay in the availability of 
new products and processes in the market and negative consequences in terms of the diffusion  6
stage. This kind of analysis can be found in Matutes et al. (1996) who, comparing different 
patent regimes, find that the best one consists in granting protection to the new technology 
developer only for some applications deriving from it. 
 In the literature,
9 there is no general agreement on which is actually the optimal patent 
system design. Different combinations of length and scope can be conceived and, differences 
in the intellectual property rights across countries gives a clear evidence of the lack of 
agreement among scholars and policy makers over the patent policy that should be 
implemented.  
The NIS literature deals as well with appropriability problems and intellectual property 
rights. However, in this framework, knowledge is perceived as prevalently tacit (not codified) 
and localized meaning that it cannot be seen entirely as a public good (Dosi, 1988; Dosi et al., 
1988). This does not mean that there are not appropriability problems but that the foundation 
of technology policy does not entirely reseed in market failure problems due to the presence 
of externalities. Nevertheless, patents can be considered a determinant of the pace of 
innovation because they are part of the rules and institutions forming a National System of 
Innovation. Differences in those rules and institutions create divergence in the innovative 
capacity across countries (Lundvall, 1988, Malerba, 2002). 
 Another source of disagreement in the literature is the actual relevance of patents as an 
instrument for intellectual property protection. Corporate espionage and reverse engineering 
can make patent protection
10 useless and, for this reason, firms have in general multiple ways 
to protect an innovative technology. On this point the empirical analysis conducted by Levin 
et al. (1987), showed that many firms do not consider patents as an effective measure of 
protection.  
In conclusion, there exist an important relationship between intellectual property rights 
and innovation, but it is important to stress how industries differ widely in the extent in which 
patents can be considered effective. The huge empirical literature
11 on the argument, pointed 
out that there are industries in which patents are intensively used and represent a key driver of 
the pace of innovation because, there, knowledge can be properly seen as a public good. 
                                                 
9  Important scholar’s contributions are for example Scotchmer and Green (1990), Scotchmer (1996) and 
O’Donoghue et al. (1998), Jaffe (2000). Klemperer (1990) and Van Dijk and Cayseele (1994) analyses focused 
on the range of patent protection in a context of product differentiation models.  
10 On this point, it is also important to consider the possibility to “invent around” patents without breaking any 
laws. 
11 Sherer et al. (1959) conducted an early enquire revealing differences on patenting behaviour across industries. 
Brower and Kleinknecht (1999) found a firm’s propensity to patent differs across sectors and depends on the 
firm size and on the innovation nature. Further econometric evidence about Levin et al (1987) hypothesis has 
been proposed by Shankerman(1991).  7
Pharmaceutical industry is considered a classical example in which patents are an important 
measure of protection that influences positively the amount of innovative efforts in that 
industry (Lacetera and Orsenigo, 2001; Lanjouw and Cockburn, 2000). Conversely, there are 
other sectors in which knowledge is more tacit and localized so that firms find other means of 
appropriability limiting the importance of patents in shaping the rate and direction of 
technological change. 
 
3. Market Structure and Innovation. 
 
This section focuses on the analysis of the relationship between market structure and 
innovation. The question here addressed is if an economic environment characterised by the 
presence of big companies and a certain level of market concentration performs better, in 
terms of dynamic efficiency, than a context of perfect competition. Seminal contributions by 
J. Shumpeter and K. Arrow can be considered the two pillars of this debate.  
Great part of the literature among the determinants of innovation, particularly in the 
Industrial Organization framework, focuses on the two well known Schumpeterian 
hypotheses (Schumpeter, 1942). The first deals with the relationship between innovation and 
monopoly power and stresses the idea that concentrated market structure boosts innovative 
activity, while, the second, is concerned with the relationship between firm size and the 
attitude to invest in innovative activities. In the Shumpeter’s (1942) view
12, monopolists have 
the possibility to attract more qualified scientist and technicians and have, in general, less 
financial constraints. R&D investments are characterised by a lower probability of success 
than investment in physical capital, in contrast, their potential revenues are usually very high 
(Sherer et al.2000). Therefore, they are more likely to be performed by firms able to bear 
risky projects and having the possibility to protect and finance their investments. Firms can 
use their current market power in order to obtain resources that can be devoted to R&D. The 
eventual output of this process, allows firms to preserve their market power, earn extra-profits 
that reward the original R&D investment and give the possibility to continue the innovative 
process.  
                                                 
12 A really interesting and exhaustive exposition of Shumpeter thought and of the subsequent related literature is 
in Scherer (1992). Cayseele (1998) performs a more recent review of contributions on the relationship between 
market structure and innovation.  8
          In contrast with Shumpeter’s ideas, Arrow (1962a) found that perfect competition is the 
environment, which gives the major incentives to innovation
13. In Arrow`s model a 
monopolistic firm appears to invest in R&D less than the competitive one. The economic 
rationale of this result is that, a quote of the monopolist rents earned after the introduction of 
an innovation, are already warranted to him before the innovative process has occurred. On 
the other hand, under perfect competition, it is actually the introduction of an innovation that 
produces all rents so, in that context, incentives to invest in R&D are greater. In other words, 
a monopolist gains less than a new entrant from the introduction of an innovation because the 
monopolist will replace part of his existing profits whether for the entrant such profits are 
completely new. 
In the Shumpeterian tradition, Nelson and Winter in their “An Evolutionary Theory of 
Economic Change”(1982) show the results of their simulations of the evolution of an 
industrial system in which emerges that productivity tends to grow with a reduction in market 
concentration. Moreover, R&D spending seems to be greater when the number of firms 
present in a given industry is not too large. 
Kamien and Schwartz (1972, 1976) developed an intermediate position between the 
two. They investigate a model in which by considering market structure as an exogenous 
variable, it is possible to study how R&D spending varies with it. They pointed out that 
innovation does not increase monotonically with concentration but, intermediate market 
environments between perfect competition and monopoly, are more likely to produce the best 
conditions to perform innovative activities. Furthermore, they found that the key determinant 
in determining the pace of innovation is not concentration but effective rivalry. High rivalry 
implies that, after an innovation has been introduced, the imitation process from rivals begins 
very rapidly conducting to a fast reduction of extra-profits earned by the innovative firm.  
The debate on market structure and innovation acquired new vitality with the emergence 
of some important contribution from Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980 a,b), Sah and Stiglitz (1987) 
and Dasgupta(1988). In these articles was reached and discussed in detail a central result, 
which is the invariance theorem according to which, the number of competing firm is 
irrelevant to the innovation process and there will be always just one or no innovator. The 
invariance theorem holds, of course, under certain restrictive conditions but, as the Modigliani 
Miller theorem in the finance literature, it can be considered a useful benchmark. In fact it has 
                                                 
13 Greenstein and Ramey (1998) re-examine Arrow (1962) and prove that a monopolistic market in the old 
product gives greater incentive to innovative activities than competition in a context of vertically differentiated 
product innovations.  9
been a valid starting point for later enquires dealing with a context of asymmetric 
information. As an example Sutton(1991, 1998) who proposed the so called bounds approach, 
investigated R&D competition in the case in which the invariance theorem’s hypotheses are 
not fulfilled, considering the long term co-evolution of market concentration, firms size 
distribution and innovative behaviour.  
The theoretical debate above reviewed reaches important results but it is far to be 
concluded so it will be useful to analyse the evidence that has emerged up to now from data. 
The empirical literature on the relationship between market structure, firm size and 
innovation is extensive but, again, there is still diffuse disagreement among scholars on the 
message provided by data and on the reliability of the results obtained. Scherer (1983) found 
that, according to Schumpeter ideas, larger firms provide better conditions to invest in new 
technologies. Although there are big differences across industries, Scherer (1984) estimated 
that innovative activities tend to increase almost linearly with firm size. As soon as new data 
became available for the US, Acs and Audretsch (1990) discovered that they were 
inconsistent with the schumpeterian hypothesis revealing that small firms performs more 
innovation per employee. Such a result was criticized by Cohen and Klepper (1992) who 
noticed that it is not sufficient to count the number of innovations because they can deeply 
differ in quality. Another important study conducted by Gerosky (1990) investigated 
empirically the relation between innovation and market structure finding that there is an 
inverse relation between concentration and the rate of investments in innovative activities. 
Cohen and Levin (1989) and more recently Blundell et al.(1999) found results consistent with 
Gerosky(1990). On the other hand, a recent contribution by Aghion et al.(2002), provides 
evidence of the hypothesis of a U-shaped relationship between competition and innovation. 
According to this view, competition effects tends to be more relevant for low level of product 
market rivalry, whether Schumpeterian effects prevail in a high competitive and with low 
level of concentration market environment. These findings maybe suggest that a moderate 
level of market power can help the development and the introduction of new technologies. 
What is interesting to note here is that numerous studies stressed that these patterns vary 
significantly across sectors and depend on other industry level factors (Acs and Audretsch, 
1990). 
Summing up, many scholars both empirically and theoretically oriented investigated the 
point with contrasting results. However it appears clearly that market structure and firm size, 
considered in industry and market specific context, can affect deeply the pace of innovation so  10
further research is needed in order to design industrial and antitrust policies aimed at 
stimulating innovation and growth. 
 
 
4. Financial structure, corporate governance and innovation 
 
This section will be divided in two parts and is aimed at giving some hints on the 
possible relations occurring between corporate governance, financial structure and innovation.  
The first question here addressed is if different corporate governance systems may have 
divergent results in terms of innovative performance while the second is related to the 
understanding of which is the role of financial systems in determining the pace of 
technological change.  
The separation between corporate ownership and control generates conflicts between 
managers and shareholders; in fact, the two can have different interests and objectives. The 
presence of asymmetric information, determines the necessity to use some control instruments 
aimed at reducing the divergence between their goals. Corporate governance consists in such 
kind of mechanisms. Different governance systems produce different effects on innovative 
activity and, their analysis can help to understand different national patterns of innovation 
(Tylecote and Conesa, 1999).  
R&D investments tend to boost the divergence between the interests of the principal 
(shareholders) and the agent (managers) because they are characterised by a high degree of 
uncertainty but also high potential returns. Shareholders, in fact, are attracted by investments 
in innovative activities because of their high potential returns and because they can spread 
risk among their portfolio of investments, in contrast, the utility of managers is closely related 
to the outcome of the project. Hence, managers will be more attracted by R&D projects 
associated with a low risk level and, for this reason; if corporate governance systems are 
ineffective the pace of innovation might be negatively affected (Munari and Sobrero, 2003). 
According to Munari and Sobrero(2003), the nature of the control system (strategic or 
financial control
14), the type of principal (which can be distinguished by the level of stock 
concentration) and the characteristics of the board (insider or outsider directors), have a 
                                                 
14 The latter distinction was proposed by Hoskisson and Hitt(1988). Roughly speaking, strategic control is 
characterized by the use of long term performance indicators and requires consistent flows of information 
between managers and shareholders, whereas financial control relies on objective, firm indipendent criteria.     11
relevant role in shaping the rate of innovative activities within firms. In particular, they 
discuss in details the following propositions: 
 
1) Strategic control appears to be more complete and appropriate than financial control 
in dealing with innovative and fast evolving environments because, within it, long-term 
strategically relevant criteria are used.  
2) Stock ownership concentration has a positive influence on R&D expenditures 
because it allows a major control on manager’s decisions and reduces their risk 
aversion. In fact Owner’s knowledge of firms activities and their monitoring capabilities 
tend to increase with concentration. 
3) The composition of the board of directors appears to be relevant in the process of 
resource allocation devoted to innovative activities. Insiders seem to be better suited as 
decision-makers than independent directors are because they have appropriate 
information about firm’s activities and this is fruitful to enhance innovation. 
 
Now we turn to the analysis of the role of financial systems in high innovative contexts. 
As we have already noticed in the discussion about market structure and innovation, large 
firms have financial advantages in R&D investments because they can rely on superior 
sources of internal finance. Moral Hazard and adverse selection phenomena seem to be 
particularly pervasive when we deal with innovative investments. Moreover, in the context of 
R&D investments, there might be high bankruptcy costs because of the inability to sell R&D 
assets at a fair price because they are strongly specific and difficult to resell.  These conditions 
are in contrast with the assumptions
15 of Modigliani Miller theorem (1958) which states that 
firm’s capital structure does not affect the decision to invest so that, on the margin, 
investments in R&D should have the same price of the others. Therefore a strong divergence 
between the cost of internal and external finance and between the cost of investments in R&D 
and in physical capital may well arise. Kamien amd Schwartz (1978) pointed out that R&D 
expenses depends crucially on the availability of internal resources. Also Hall (1992) and 
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) argue that the rate of innovation might be sensitive to 
financial factors
16. It seems in fact that, not only less developed markets which are not 
                                                 
15 The theorem assumes infact that there is no asymmetric information so that problems of adverse selection and 
moral hazard are not taken into account. Moreover, the absence of bankruptcy and default is assumed. 
16 There is an extensive literature on cash constraints and R&D investments. Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen(1988) proposed, as a measure of the level of a firm financial constraints, the sensitivity of investments 
to cash-flow.  A number of empirical studies, verified that innovative firms tend to be more cash constrained and  12
capable to offer the diversity of capital instruments needed to come close to the market 
completeness, but also UK and US markets produce “finance gaps” that may largely affect 
R&D spending because firms might be financially constrained. Differences across countries 
in the completeness of markets for finance, in the legal treatment of bankruptcy as well in the 
bank lending regime, in government policies for credit market and in monetary policy
17, are 
capable to determine differences in countries innovative capacity (Canepa and Stoneman, 
2002). 
In conclusion, once again, institutional and organisational variables seem to be relevant 
in shaping the pace of technological change. Different credit and corporate governance 
systems produce diverse results in terms of dynamic efficiency. However there is no general 
agreement in the literature so a clear policy advice cannot be given, but it is sure that policy 
makers, managers and shareholders should keep in mind these results.  
 
5. Geography and innovation 
 
This section is devoted to the analysis of the effect of industries geographical 
concentration on technological change. In order to assess how local considerations may affect 
the pace of innovation, we will briefly present four different theoretical perspectives that deal 
with this issue such as the Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) view, the contributions of 
Jacobs(1969), Porter (1990,1998) and the Regional Innovation System framework
18. 
 The seminal work by Marshall (1920) further restated by Arrow (1962 a,b) and Romer 
(1986, 1990), claimed that geographical agglomeration of industries produces knowledge 
externalities which can have positive effects on the rate of innovation and economic growth.  
Arrow (1962 a) shed light on the particular characteristics of the knowledge good and 
on the idea that knowledge spills over. The questioned point is that because great part of 
knowledge is tacit and localised, spillover effects are spatially bounded (Antonelli, 1999). To 
clear the point it is useful to distinguish between the concepts of “information” and 
“knowledge”. The first is easy to be codified and, especially considering the current evolution 
of Information and Communication Technologies, can be transmitted at very low marginal 
                                                                                                                                                          
that there is a positive relationship between cash-flow and R&D investments (see Hao and Jaffe, 1993; Mulkay, 
Hall and Mairesse, 2000; Hall, 2002). These results seem to be in line with the theoretical considerations 
expressed above. 
17 Schiantarelli (1996) provides support to the hypothesis that the strength of financial constraints varies with 
monetary policy. A monetary restriction leading to lower net worth produces an increase of the external finance 
premium and it can lead  a reduction of bank loans.  
18 A good reference on these issues is Audretsch and Feldman (2003)  13
costs while, the second, cannot be codified or formalized so that his marginal cost of 
transportation raises with distance. It is for such reasons that Von Hipple (1994) argued that 
face to face and repeated interactions among different economic agents, is the most effective 
way in transmitting knowledge producing positive externalities. Hence, physical proximity 
enhances flows of technological knowledge spreading across entrepreneurs, engineers and 
workers
19.   
The view expressed by the MAR model is that knowledge spillovers are enhanced by 
the presence of a strong concentration of a single industry in a given area. Here it is stressed 
the argument that innovation is facilitated when local actors share common activities because 
they belong to the same sector. In fact it is argued that communications, and knowledge 
transmission are less expensive in a context of a single concentrated industry with respect to 
the case of diversified industries. A corollary of this argument is that local monopoly is to be 
considered a more conducive environment for innovation because companies can internalise 
the spillover effects deriving by the production of new knowledge.  
According to this perspective, it emerges a clear policy implication i.e. governments 
should stimulate a growing local concentration of a single industry without hampering the 
emergence of local market power. 
Opposite conclusions can be derived by the analysis of Jacobs thought. In fact, she 
believes that the major source of knowledge spillovers comes from the interaction of actors 
belonging to different industries. Industry diversity within a given region is the key driver of 
technological externalities and innovation. The diversity of skills, expertise, experiences, 
needs and the easiness of human relationships offered by a local context, is seen as a major 
source of promoting innovation and growth. Hence, with the work of Jacobs, a second type of 
externalities emerges by considering spillovers across different industries.  
The role of knowledge spillovers produced by geographically concentrated industries 
was also analyzed by Porter (1990), who agrees with the MAR view about the positive effect 
of industry geographical concentration. However, in contrast with MAR model he stressed the 
role of strong competition between local firms within the same industry in determining the 
pace of innovation.  
Porter (1998, p. 78) defines clusters as a “geographic concentration of interconnected 
companies and institution in a particular field”. According to Porter, clusters affect 
competition by increasing the productivity of companies sited in a certain area, by running the 
                                                 
19 See Baptista (2001) for an analysis of the effects of geographical proximity and technology diffusion.  14
rate and the direction of technological change and, finally, by encouraging the entry of new 
firms in the market. The advantages deriving from clustering can be divided into demand and 
supply side components. On the first side, the presence of a strong local demand deriving 
from related firms and the possibility to establish long-lasting relationships with customers, 
seem to be rather important benefits deriving from clusters. Customer requirements and 
feedbacks can, in fact, give relevant flows of information that can be used to derive new ideas 
for innovation. On the supply side, geographical concentrated firms belonging to the same 
industry can have access to a pool of skilled and high experienced workers with low 
recruiting costs. On the other hand, knowledge exchange between workers belonging to 
different industries but sharing the same scientific and technology base affect positively the 
innovative activity. Moreover Porter (1998) highlights that, talented people having different 
backgrounds, can be easily attracted because a cluster reduces the risk of relocation for 
employees. A second advantage is that it is easier to find high quality related inputs at low 
costs. Innovative activities are associated with high level of uncertainty, which can be reduced 
through the presence of a local network of innovators that allows agents to share similar 
experiences and ease the exploitation of new solutions to problems (Feldman, 1993). 
In the definition of clusters given by Porter(1998) it emerges a role played by local 
institutions in shaping the external environment in which different agents interact in order to 
produce innovative efforts. The importance of the local institutional framework for innovation 
has been particularly stressed by what we called the National Innovation System approach 
through the notion of Regional Innovation System (RIS) (Cooke et al. 1997, 1998). 
A RIS can be defined as a local system in which firms, other organizations and 
institutions are involved in interactive learning activities aimed at producing and developing 
innovations. Local institutional and organisational routines, social conventions promote 
systemic interaction around the exploitation of new ideas and the use of new technologies. 
Hence, in this perspective, local public intervention through the correct design of proper 
knowledge infrastructures promote technology production and diffusion by favouring the 
emergence of flows of knowledge and technology spillovers. 
From the empirical point of view, three major areas of analysis can be conceived. These 
are aimed at assessing the importance of knowledge spillovers at local level, testing the 
hypothesis that, given the presence of local externalities, clustered firms are more likely to be 
engaged in innovative efforts and, finally, at discovering which is the most important source 
of externalities, diversity or a single industry concentration.    15
 The first result to be cited is that provided by Jaffe (1989) and Acs et al. (1992) who 
dealt with measurement issues related to knowledge spillovers. By modifying the knowledge 
production function in order to take into account geographical effects, they found strong 
evidence of the importance of knowledge spillovers due to the presence of local university, 
public research centres and industry R&D laboratories.  
On the second point Audretsch and Feldman (1996), using the Small Business 
Administration Innovation Citation Data, gave evidence supporting the idea that firms with a 
high innovative propensity tend to cluster more than firms belonging to more traditional 
sectors. Similar results are founded by Baptista and Swann (1998) who, using a database of 
innovations in the UK, give a positive answer to the question risen in the title of their article 
which is: “Do firms in clusters innovate more?”.   
Finally, Sherer (1982) found that a great part of inventions in a given industry is used in 
other industries confirming the argument proposed by Jacobs. These results are confirmed by 
Glaeser et al. (1992) who, through the analysis of a data set on geographical concentration 
and competition in 170 of the largest US cities over the period 1956-87, gave evidence 
supporting Jacobs’ point of view and by Feldman and Audretsch (1999). The latter proved 
that the presence of different and complementary industries within the same region is more 
conducive to innovative activities than the existence of a single industry specialization.  
In conclusion, what it is important to stress is that if we consider innovation as resulting 
from the interplay between generic knowledge and learning processes occurring in a localized 
context (Antonelli, 1995b), geography, proximity and location seems to be vital for 
innovation. If information flows produce increasing returns (Romer, 1986, 1990), but such 
flows are geographically bounded (Marshall, 1920; Krugman 1991), then they can explain 
part of the differences experienced in the rate of growth of economies
20.  
Though more research is needed in this field of enquire. In particular, the identification 
of different types of knowledge spillovers and of mechanisms through which they emerge are 
two important goals for future research. 
 
 
6. Demand and innovation 
 
                                                 
20 It should be noted that these results seems to be robust to the introduction and the diffusion of new information 
technologies that facilitate flows of information. It has been claimed that in cognitive process, local interactions  16
In this section, we will discuss the importance of demand considerations when the 
innovation process is analysed. We will briefly present the analysis of the so called demand-
pull hypothesis proposed by Schmookler considering as well, how Schmookler’s thought was 
re-examined by the subsequent economic literature. Moreover, we will try to show how this 
argument can be extended at the aggregate level. 
From the analysis conducted up to this point, the role of demand side factors has been 
almost neglected. Economic theory seemed to be more concerned with the analysis of supply 
side factors enhancing innovation and this fact is maybe due to the importance assumed in the 
literature by the technology push model, which describes the innovation process as entirely 
deriving from an exogenous advancement in scientific and technological knowledge. In this 
model, market considerations are not taken into account and there is no relation between 
technological change and demand. Market is seen as capable of absorbing passively all the 
introduced innovations. 
However, there has been an influential contribution in the literature by Schmookler 
(1966) who, in particular at micro-level, studied the relationship between market demand and 
the rate and direction of technological change.  
According to this author, technological change is not driven by scientific discoveries but 
it is the existence of demand for a particular invention to really matter. Scientific knowledge 
is still important because it determines what Schmookler calls the “inventive potential”, but, 
essentially, market forces choose which invention will be actually realised
21. Therefore, 
innovative activities tend to react to the presence of an expected profitability deriving from a 
market demand expansion which is, actually, the real incentive to innovation. Schmookler 
analyses both theoretically and empirically these issues, considering consumption and 
investment goods market as well. He concludes that the number of inventions in a given field 
tends to vary over time with sales in the related class of products. Therefore, differences in the 
number of invention across distinct product classes in the same period can be explained 
directly with variations in sales (see Schmookler, 1966, p114). 
The demand-pull hypothesis was restated by many later contributions. Here we mention 
an important one performed by Gilpin(1975), who considered market demand as the primary 
determinant of successful innovation. Such kind of literature was reviewed and criticised, in 
                                                                                                                                                          
and personal contacts display a relevant role and that ICT can help to explain the success of certain local 
systems. For a discussion on this issue, see Rallet and Torre (2000) , Audretsch  (2000) and Antonelli (2003).  
21 On this point Schmookler (Invention and Economic Growth, 1966, p.112) writes: “ The idea that the inventor 
is a man possessed by an idea and driven for months or years to develop it regardless of its market value,  17
particular on the empirical ground, by Mowery and Rosemberg (1979), Scherer (1982) and 
later by  Kleinknecht and Verspagen(1990). These articles share the idea that the empirical 
evidence in favour of the demand-pull hypothesis is less robust than what was claimed in 
advance. Data used by Schmookler seem, in fact, not to be representative of the US economy 
therefore, the hypothesis was tested again using a broader set of data which confirms the 
existence of a positive correlation between demand and innovation even if it turns out to be 
less strong than Schmookler would have expected. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the relationship between demand and innovation can 
be extended at the macro-level, in fact, macroeconomic conditions are likely to affect the rate 
of innovative activities (Kaldor, 1957; Shleifer, 1986).  
Gerosky and Walters (1995) give an important contribution on this issue showing that 
innovations tend to have a pro-cyclic behaviour and that demand granger cause innovation
22. 
According to Gerosky and Walters, the economic explanation of this phenomenon is twofold. 
Firstly, markets have a limited ability to absorb new products in a given period so that, when 
a demand expansion is registered, this capacity tends to grow making the introduction of 
innovation more profitable. On the other hand, appropriability problems are associated to 
innovative activities so that firms often have a limited time to gain profits from the 
introduction of a novelty. It is for this reason that innovations are more likely to appear in 
periods characterised by a growing demand trend. Hence, since macroeconomic conditions 
can affect the expected profitability of innovative investments, it is possible to argue that 
governments approach to macroeconomic policies can have important effects on 
technological change and growth. Therefore, in considering the opportunity of restrictive 
policies it seems necessary to take into account their effects on the pace of innovation. 
We believe that the analysis of demand considerations in the study of innovation and 
technological change is at a very early stage and that future research efforts should be done in 
order to improve our comprehension of these issues
23. Two principal research questions 
should be considered in order to look at the relationship between demand and innovation from 
both sides. The first is related to the assessment of the relevance of the demand-pull 
hypothesis through theoretical and empirical analysis considering also new advancements in 
the formulation of models for innovation. The second should be addressed to understand the 
                                                                                                                                                          
probably holds for some inventors. It is certainly the kind of inventor imagined by cartoonist, but it hardly 
describes the typical inventor. His creations find a commercial market too often for it to be true.” 
22 Kleinknecht (1996) gives evidence of the existence of a positive relationship between demand and R&D 
investments.   18
effects of innovation on each component of the effective demand such as consumption, 
investments and exports. In this way, it will be possible to have significant advancements both 
in theory and from a policy perspective.  
 
7. Human capital and innovation 
 
This section is devoted to the analysis of the contribution of human capital to 
technological change and economic growth. 
In models that we label ideas-driven the level of human capital, which can be 
represented by the level of schooling, skills and competencies of a given population, is seen 
as a key determinant of economic growth (Lucas, 1988; Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992). In 
Lucas (1988), investments in human capital produce positive externalities that enhance the 
economic system’s productivity and foster his growth’s rate. This can be explained because 
technological change is positively affected by the average level of human capital which 
determines, as Schultz (1975) argued, the ability of individuals to adapt to an environment 
characterized by technological dynamics. 
Nelson and Phelps (1966) gave a seminal contribution in the study of the interaction 
between human capital and technological change. Roughly speaking, the intuition is that 
different levels of human capital determine differences across countries in the technology 
adopted and affect the way in which those technologies are used. Recently Acemoglu and 
Zilibotti (2001), build a model in which they found explicitly that a country with less skilled 
workers would have greater difficulties in implementing effectively technologies belonging to 
the innovation possibilities frontier, because of the derived lack of absorptive capacity.  
A second argument in favour of the importance of human capital for innovation has 
been proposed by Roy (1997) who points out that in most models of endogenous growth there 
is a linear relation between the number of researchers and the rate of technological progress, 
while, in reality, negative externalities due to congestion effects may appear. In fact, it is 
possible to argue that, if the number of researchers per project increases beyond a certain 
level, congestion externalities reduce productivity of the average researcher. This problem 
tend to be less stringent if the number of ideas and of the related projects increases as well as 
the number of researchers but that is possible only if the level of human capital quality is 
higher. 
                                                                                                                                                          
23 Similar conclusions have clearly emerged from the symposium held in Jena (1997). The results are published 
by the Journal of Evolutionary Economics (2001) vol.11.  19
From a different perspective, the NIS literature reaches very similar results. Here the 
educative system is seen as part of the set of organisations and institutions composing the 
National System of Innovation. Advanced countries and less developed countries (LDC) 
differ deeply in the average level of schooling of their populations. LDC are in fact 
characterised by low level of participation to high degree of instruction and, in addition, a 
large number of their high skilled workers leave the country in order to have greater personal 
opportunities
24. 
From the innovation point of view, it is important to stress that the educative system and 
in particular universities are aimed at diffusing base knowledge, giving technical and 
scientific competencies and finally at promoting and developing research in their laboratories. 
Furthermore, the NIS approach stresses the importance of interconnections between 
universities and the productive system and underlines the success obtained by USA in 
promoting such kind of collaborations ( Montobbio, 2000).  
The empirical literature presents some evidence in favour of a positive role of human 
capital in shaping the pace of innovation. As an example Benhabib and Spiegel (1993), using 
cross country data, do not reject the presence of an additional source of influence of human 
capital on economic growth due to the interaction with technology. Cross-country data are 
used as well by Hall and Jones (1999) who detect a strong correlation between human capital 
and TFP.  
In conclusions it is important to stress that, as Lucas (1988) showed, the private return 
of investments in human capital is inferior to the social one. So, if as we have argued human 
capital is a relevant driver of innovation and economic growth, public intervention is 
obviously needed in this field.  
 
Technology policy, regulation and innovation 
 
         From the review, it emerges clearly that the theoretical foundations of technology policy 
are different for what we call ideas driven endogenous growth theories and National 
Innovation System approach.  
From the first perspective market failures originated by the presence of externalities, 
uncertainty and problems related to asymmetric information strongly affect decisions to invest 
in innovative activities creating conditions for public intervention (Martin and Scott, 2000). 
                                                 
24 This phenomenon is known in the literature as brain drain.  20
Incentives and subsidies (David et al, 2000), the patent system (Levin et al.,1987), the 
strength of antitrust policy Porter (2001), the promotion of Research Joint Ventures 
(Cassiman, 2000), diffusion policies (Gerosky, 2000), the design of credit system (Canepa 
and Stoneman, 2002), the improvement of human capital (Lucas, 1988), are some of the 
instruments that policy makers can use to enhance innovation. 
  In contrast, the National Innovation System approach goes beyond market failures 
rationale for technology policy and stress the importance of the institutional framework of an 
economy in shaping the pace of innovation (Metcalfe, 1995).  The system of institutions
25 has 
to be designed in order to promote the interaction between private firms, public research 
institute and other key private and public actors.  
However, the relevance of the state in driving innovation cannot be confined to 
technology policy. In fact, the state plays an “autonomous” role through the effect of other 
policy measures adopted to obtain other policy goals. As an example, regulation is a way 
through which governments can influence the pace of innovation. To impose standards rules 
and other form of economic instruments means changing constraints and creating new 
incentives faced by firms taking decisions aimed at maximising their profits. This will have 
effects also on choices regarding innovative activities.  
Here we will consider the analysis of the consequences on innovation of a particular 
example of regulation that is environmental regulation. The interaction between 
environmental policy and innovative activities has been a source of an interesting debate 
among economist (Corral, 2002). The point is that profit maximising firms do not consider 
reducing pollution as a private objective because of the presence of standard externality 
problems. Therefore, governments have to design appropriate policy instruments that, by 
changing external economic conditions for companies, are capable to influence the rate and 
direction of technological change. At a first sight, the performance of the economic system in 
which such policies are implemented seems to be definitely harmed. Anyway, it is possible to 
argue that flows of innovation produced in reaction to environmental policies allow a country 
to become a net exporter of environmental technologies
26. The idea in his most strong 
formulation is that the shock produced by a new regulation creates an external pressure on 
firms, which are fostered to create new product and processes that affect positively the 
dynamic behaviour of that economy and hence his social welfare. Porter and van der Linde 
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social and ethic values.  
26 This is known in the literature as the “Porter hypothesis”.   21
(1995) found evidence supporting this hypothesis even if they conclude that environmental 
regulation has to be designed properly i.e. be, according to the definition of Jaffe et al.(2002), 
“technology forcing” in order to actually obtain the claimed results. On the other hand Jaffe 
and Palmer (1997) empirical analysis shows that there is a positive correlation between green 
regulation and R&D expenditure, but the same is not true for patents production. Finally, 
Newell et al.(1999) by considering the effects of energy-efficiency standards, found evidence 
that they were responsible of a considerable amount of innovation. 
 The autonomous impact on technological change due to the presence of the state of 
course is not limited to regulation activities. The dimension of welfare state is for sure another 
variable able to affect innovation. It has been claimed that a larger public intervention, by 
creating huge government bureaucracies, can hamper the pace of innovation because most 
talented people tend to become rent seekers (Murphy et al., 1991). On the other hand, the 
welfare state is a way through which uncertainty is reduced and this has positive effects on 
investments in innovative activities (Leon, 2003). 
The debate on issue related to the importance of the role of the state in determining the 
pace of innovation is still open. Future research is needed for a better comprehension of the 
theory and the practice of technology policy. Furthermore, particular attention should be 
devoted to study in detail the effects of the other forms of public intervention on innovation in 




In this paper, we reviewed the most relevant determinants of innovation. What has 
emerged is that innovation is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon and that a large 
amount of factors tends to influence it. The presence of many difficulties in studying 
innovation is confirmed by the fact that diverse theoretical approaches coexist in the 
economic literature and, in fact, to present the analysis of the determinants of innovation, it 
has been necessary   to consider all these different perspectives. However, we believe that 
they share common opinions on the importance of technological change for economic growth. 
This large consensus is enlightened by the importance attributed to public intervention in 
promoting innovation and technological change at a policy level. In this sense, the outcome of 
the european councils held in Lisbona (2000) and in Barcelona (2002) confirms that the 
common strategy of european partners is to increase R&D expenditure up to 3% of GDP in 
order to sustain growth.   22
However, to increase R&D spending is not sufficient. According to what emerges from 
this review, an effective sustain to innovation derives from a set of policies oriented at 
designing a proper environment for innovative activities both at a national and at a local level.  
From the first point of view, it has been underlined for example the importance of 
patents, market structure, human capital and demand considerations in determining the pace 
of innovation.  
We discussed the analysis of the economics of intellectual property right protection 
showing how there is no general agreement on which is the best patent policy to promote 
innovation. We showed also that there are differences among industries concerning the effects 
of patents on technological change patterns. A better understanding of these issues is an 
obvious goal for future research. 
Furthermore, it has been claimed that innovation is related to market structure. Even if 
economists produced relevant theoretical advancements in this field, it is still not clear which 
market environment performs better in terms of innovation. However, the debate has been 
useful in order to show how dynamic considerations should be taken into account by antitrust 
authorities. A promising field of enquire is to analyse the effects of alliances, mergers and 
acquisitions and other forms of collaboration on innovation from an antitrust perspective. 
In the review emerges the importance of human capital to perform innovative activities. 
On this point, there is general agreement in the literature in particular, investments in 
scientific and technological education seem to be conducive to a better employment of human 
resources devoted to produce innovation. 
Finally, we showed that, in the promotion of technological change, not only supply 
factors matter. The demand-pull hypothesis shed light on the importance of market 
considerations in the study of innovative dynamics. Future research should be addressed to 
study both sides of the relationship between demand and innovation. In particular, the 
analysis of the effects of innovation on demand has been almost neglected in the literature. 
In the paper we stressed how technology policy has to deal also with the local dimension 
of innovation. The presence of spatially bounded knowledge spillovers suggests, in fact, that 
great part of innovative activities takes place at local level. Hence, regional technology 
policies have to be designed in order to shape the local environment, which is better suited to 
spur innovation. Further research is needed for the correct identification of different types of 
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